The Communications Decency Act and the Indecent Indecency Spectacle by Kushner, David
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 19 | Number 1 Article 4
1-1-1996
The Communications Decency Act and the
Indecent Indecency Spectacle
David Kushner
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Kushner, The Communications Decency Act and the Indecent Indecency Spectacle, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 87 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol19/iss1/4
The Communications Decency Act




I. What the Communications Decency Act Proscribes and
Prescribes ............................................................................ . 90
II. Why the Indecency Ban Is Unconstitutional .................... 95
III. Why the Television Ratings Provisions Are
U nconstitutional ................................................................... 108
IV. Cyberspace as Postmodern Spectacle ................ 115
A. The Spectacular Nature of Postmodernity .................. 116
B. The Import of Convergence ................... 118
C. Sex and Violence as Commodity .................................. 123
D. Implications for First Amendment Jurisprudence in
a Postmodern M illennium ............................................ 128
t Copyright © 1996 by David Kushner
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Sam J. Ervin, III, United States Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. A.B., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
1985; Ph.D., Princeton University, 1990; J.D., Duke University, 1996.
HASTINGS COMMIENT Li. [VoL. 19:87
To violate your ban on indecency, I have been forced to use and
overuse so-called indecent language. But if I called you a bunch of
goddam motherfucking cocksucking cunt-eating blue-balled
bastards with the morals of muggers and the intelligence of pond
scum, that would be nothing compared to this indictment, to
wit: you have sold the First Amendment, your birthright and that of
your children ...
And what mess of pottage have you acquired in exchange for the
rights of a free people? Have you cleansed the Internet of even the
rawest pornography? No, because it is a worldwide system.
-Steve Russell, retired Texas trial judge, in the electronic
newspaper The American Reporter'
As the indispensable packaging for things produced as they are now
produced, as a general gloss on the rationality of the system, and as
the advanced economic sector directly responsible for the
manufacture of an ever-growing mass of image-objects, the spectacle
is the chief product of present-day society.
-Guy Debord, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE, Thesis 15
On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Telecommunications Act of 1996? This sweeping new law is intended
to sweep away regulation and promote a competitive environment in
which telecommunications technologies will flourish in the twenty-first
century. Swept away, too, are free speech and the marketplace of
ideas, which are not among the intended beneficiaries of this new
competitive environment. In fact, despite this rhetoric of deregulation,
the Act actively promotes spectacular new forms of censorship in Title
V, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (hereinafter the CDA),3
including draconian criminal penalties for violations of an "indecency"
ban in cyberspace4 and mandated television ratings for use with new
V-chip program blocking technology. 5
1. Steve Russell, The X-On Congress: Indecent Comment on an Indecent Subject
(published Feb. 8, 1996)(visited Dec. 16, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Am_
Reporter..v_DoJ/020896.article>.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
3. Id. at §§ 501-561,110 Stat. at 133-43.
4. Id. at § 502, 110 Stat. at 133-36.
5. Id. at § 551,110 Stat. at 139-42.
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The CDA transforms Congress into the little boy who stuck his
finger in the dike,6 hoping to prevent the rising tide of cybersmut and
television violence from engulfing us. Evidently, Congress had no
conception of what cyberspace is, let alone how one navigates in it.
When Congress promoted the convergence of telecommunications
technologies by permitting long-distance companies, local exchange
carriers, and cable operating companies to compete with one another,
did it realize what such convergence means? Broadcast, cable, satellite,
the Internet-ultimately these all are cyberspace.
More fundamentally, it appears Congress fails to understand the
necessary implications of our postmodern culture and its capitalistic
system. We are not in Kansas anymore. Passing the CDA will not even
be as effective as clicking our collective heels three times. As Guy
Debord so perspicaciously observed nearly thirty years ago, the whole
life of our society "presents itself as an immense accumulation of
spectacles."7 The CDA is merely spectacle itself-from the signing
ceremony of the Telecommunications Act with entertainer Lily
Tomlin portraying Ernestine in a send-up of cyberspace (and
Vice-President Gore ignominiously guffawing beside her)8 to the
chest-pounding of the legislation's sponsors on the Senate floor for the
benefit of certain political constituents9 to the immediate plethora of
lawsuits challenging the CDA 1° to the kowtowing of network
6. This metaphor is particularly apt as that dike was Dutch and some of the most sought-
after cybersmut is available from Dutch servers. On the other hand, if the metaphor is read as a
double entendre, has the CDA been violated if this essay is read on-line vis-h-vis in printed
format?
7. Guy DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE, Thesis 1 (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans.,
Zone Books 1994) (1967).
& All Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 8, 1996).
9. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S8329-30, S8333 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)(statements of Sen.
Exon); id. at S8333 (statement of Sen. Coats).
10. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.), prob.juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554
(1996); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); American Library Ass'n v.
United States Dep't of Justice, No. 96-1458, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7919 (E.D. Pa. June 12,
1996)(filed Feb. 26, 1996 and consolidated and decided with ACLU). The Shea suit concerns the
Steve Russell editorial, a quote from which begins this essay. This essay so begins for two
important reasons. First, it shows that the "free expression libertarians" are as much a part of the
spectacle surrounding the CDA as its promoters. In fact, they will go-indeed, must go-to
spectacular lengths to champion their viewpoint and cultivate its image. The Debord quotation
with which Russell's is juxtaposed, then, not only informs a key aspect of this essay and explains
its title but serves to undercut Russell's approach. Second, while the manifest vulgarity of
Russell's language may lead one to question the wisdom of his approach, or my own good taste in
reproducing it, there is no real issue as to the legality of publishing such language in a printed
legal journal. Query whether the transfer of such language from print on a page to print
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executives as they abruptly changed face and "voluntarily" embraced
television ratings.' Indeed, our postmodern condition is such that we
expect no less than such spectacles-and no more.
This essay may appear schizophrenic: In the first three parts I will
(1) examine in a thoroughly traditional way the actual text of the
CDA, (2) analyze why the "indecency" ban is unconstitutional under
current First Amendment jurisprudence, and (3) suggest why the
television ratings provisions are likewise unconstitutional. In the
fourth and final part I will argue that in postmodern cyberspace the
first three parts are essentially irrelevant (but are included in the essay
for those who think they need them to operate in "reality"), that the
CDA and other like forms of censorship are fundamentally
unenforceable, and that sex and violence are the principal fruits of
desire in cyberspace. In a culture in which sex, violence, politics, news,
and speech are all commodified as the reified image, cyberspace does
not represent the global village. Rather, cyberspace is the ultimate
spectacle of the hyperreality of late capitalism. So log in and tune out.
I
What the Communications Decency Act Proscribes and
Prescribes
As if we have not already been saturated by the media with
descriptions of the CDA and its intended and likely effects, we should
nevertheless be clear at the outset precisely what the CDA proscribes
and prescribes-before showing why it is unconstitutional and then
why it is unenforceable and irrelevant. Media attention has focused on
what appear to be two distinct provisions, one prohibiting indecent
communications by a telecommunications device or interactive
computer service, 2 the other prescribing the establishment of a
television rating code and mandating that new televisions contain the
so-called V-chip to block certain rated programming.13 I say these
appearing on one's computer screen, and nothing more, ought to make any legal significance, as
the CDA may demand.
11. See, e.g., A Statement by All Segments of the Television Industry (published Feb. 29,
1996)(visited Nov. 29, 1996)<http://www.nab.org/issues/tvrating.htm>; Elizabeth Jensen and
Bryan Gruley, TV Networks Could Use Ratings System as Chip in Battle Against Airwaves Fee,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1996, at B3.
12. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-36
(1996).
13. See id. at § 551, 110 Stat. at 139-42. Hereinafter provisions of the Act that are to be
codified will be cited only by their future U.S. Code citation.
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appear to be two distinct provisions, but, with the convergence of
telecommunications technologies and the consolidation of the
industry, such differentiation in cyberspace will be meaningless.
The heart of the indecency ban is an amended 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)
and a new 47 U.S.C. § 223(d). Amended § 223(a) provides, in part:
(a) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass another person;
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication which is obscene or indecent,
knowing that the recipient of the communication is under
18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call or initiated the
communication; . . .
shall be fined under Title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
A "telecommunications device" is specifically defined to exclude an
interactive computer service,14 but it would apparently include a
modem, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a pager, or any similar
device that could be used for private e-mail communication.
The aspects of this language that proscribe speech that is obscene,
constitutes child pornography, or harasses the recipient are generally
thought to be unproblematic, since this is speech that is not
constitutionally protected even for adults. 15 But this statutory language
would on its face prohibit an English professor from knowingly
transmitting to a 17-year old freshman the text of D.H. Lawrence's
14. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(h)(1)(B) (West 1996).
15. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)(obscenity); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747 (1982)(child pornography). In fact, sending obscenity and child pornography by
computer is already a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-65 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-52, 2256-
57 (1994); see also United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996)(upholding convictions for
violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 in connection with the operation of an adult electronic bulletin
board).
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Lady Chatterly's Lover or even a law professor knowingly transmitting
to a high school moot court team member the text of the Supreme
Court's Pacifica decision, which contains George Carlin's infamous
monologue on the "Seven Dirty Words," since these works have been
adjudged "indecent."16
New § 223(d) provides:
(d) Whoever-
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a
specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by
paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
An "interactive computer service" is defined as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions."' 7
The "display" prohibition of § 223(d)(1)(B) is particularly broad.
The "patently offensive" standard is intended to codify the Pacifica
definition of indecency. 8 Thus, banned material need not possess
prurient appeal, nor does the statutory language save material with
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.9 Clearly, Carlin's
seven dirty words are forbidden, and Playboy must entirely revamp its
16. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,741 & n.16, 751 (1978).
17. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(2) (West 1996).
18, See 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CONF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996)(citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
19. Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973)(providing test for obscenity).
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homepage. Indeed, as the Conference Report notes, the conferees
explicitly rejected the "harmful to minors"2 1 standard which its
proponents claimed exempted material with serious value of the usual
litany.2' Instead, the conferees suggested that because a patently
offensive offense required both a patently offensive intent and result,
material with serious redeeming value would lack the requisite intent,
as an inquiry into "context" would show.' However, an ex post facto
context inquiry will do little to prevent the initial chilling of speech.
Not only is a broad and inherently subjective category of
constitutionally-protected indecent speech criminalized, but nearly all
Internauts and other on-line users are at risk for that speech. Except
for the most passive surfers who never post to a newsgroup or send an
e-mail, all other users are also content providers. They will necessarily
use an interactive computer service and/or telecommunications device.
Because of the nature, of the Internet, the material these users provide,
via newsgroups, listservs, chat rooms, etc., can normally be accessed by
anyone and thus will be "display[ed] in a manner available to a person
under 18 years of age."'  The indecency ban of the CDA literally
regulates virtually everyone in cyberspace.25 It makes a mockery of
new 47 U.S.C. § 230, in which Congress specifically found it to be
the policy of the United States "to preserve the vibrant and
20. See 141 CONG. REC. S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)(statement of Sen. Exon, the CDA's
principal sponsor, suggesting the prohibition could apply to Playboy magazine when available to
minors without any reasonable restriction).
21. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641-43 (1968).
22. See 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CONF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
23. Id. (citing, inter alia, In re Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 7 FCC Rcd. 6873, 6875
(1992)).
24. In fact, with services such as DejaNews, which archives the posts to some 15,000 Usenet
newsgroups, this material may remain available to be "displayed" to a minor years from now.
See the DejaNews website at <http://www.dejanews.com/dnabout.html>(visited Dec. 16, 1996).
25. In addition to access provider defenses in the new 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(1), (e)(2), and
(e)(3), and an innocent employer defense in § 223(e)(4), the CDA does provide for a general
good faith defense in § 223(e)(5), borrowed from the dial-a-por context, for prosecutions under
subsections (a)(1)(B) or (d) if a person takes "reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors ... including any method which
is feasible under available technology," 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)(A), or "has restricted access to
such communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number," id. at § 223(e)(5)(B). For the non-commercial or casual
content provider, i.e. most of us, the credit card/password defense is impossible to implement,
and it is far from certain whether other access-blocking technologies, which ultimately may be no
different than a cyberspace V-chip in reverse, will permit us average-joes to ever invoke the
defense. Posting a "Minors Prohibited" heading appears to be facially inadequate based on the
statutory language and, of course, only serves as an invitation to the curious minor.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.[ 9
competitive free market that presently [sic] exists for the Internet and
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.
' 26
The V-chip provision can be summarized much more succinctly.
The predicate for a television ratings code and the V-chip blocking
technology itself is laid in § 551(a) of the CDA. There Congress found
violent and sexually-oriented video programming to have an adverse
impact on children, the government to possess a compelling interest to
address the problem, and ratings and technological blocking tools to
be "nonintrusive and narrowly tailored means" of achieving that
interest. 2 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is
directed to prescribe guidelines and recommended procedures for
rating violent and indecent programming, based on the
recommendations of a balanced advisory committee that the FCC
itself appoints,' and to prescribe rules requiring distributors of
programming to transmit the rating of any rated program?2 The
Conference Report distinguishes between these latter ratings
transmission rules, which are requirements, and the former ratings
guidelines, which are not. Thus, the Commission may require neither
any particular rating system nor that any particular program be
rated.' The Commission's hand, however, is stayed for one year to
allow the television and cable industries to establish "voluntary rules"
for rating programming and to agree "voluntarily to broadcast signals
that contain ratings."'" These "voluntary rules" must be acceptable to
the Commission.
The second prong is the V-chip itself. All televisions, 13 inches or
greater in size, shipped in interstate commerce or manufactured in the
United States, are required to be "equipped with a feature designed to
enable viewers to block display of all programs with a common
rating."' 2 The effective date of this manufacturing provision cannot be
later than February 8, 1998. 33
26. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b)(2) (West 1996)(emphasis added).
27. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(a), 110 Stat. 56, 139-
40 (1996).
28. Id. at § 551(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 140-41.
29. 47 U.S.C.A. § 303(w) (West 1996).
30. 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1131 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CoNF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
31. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(e)(1), 110 Stat. 56, 142 (1996).
32. 47 U.S.C.A. § 303(x) (West 1996).
33. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 142.
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Although the statutory language of the V-chip legislation may
appear relatively innocuous on its face, especially if the conferees'
intent that the FCC not be authorized to require a particular program
to be rated be taken seriously, a general television ratings scheme and
the requirement that any ratings be transmitted will work a major
transformation of the video programming industry in this country.
However, the nature of that transformation may be far from
what Congress intended. Moreover, given the convergence of
communications technologies and the ultimate unity of cyberspace, it
is not at all clear how the CDA's indecency ban and V-chip provisions
will interact.
II
Why the Indecency Ban Is Unconstitutional
Whether it be true that cyberspace is a fundamentally new type of
entity requiring a different paradigm for its governance and
regulation, it is nevertheless clear that the CDA's indecency ban is
unconstitutional under current First Amendment jurisprudence. 
3
Because the ban is a content-based restriction, it fails a strict scrutiny
analysis. In particular, it impermissibly reduces the material available
to adults to a level only appropriate for children. Moreover, the less
stringent Pacifica jurisprudence of the broadcast medium does not
apply to cyberspace. The ban also fails to pass constitutional muster
because the term "indecent" in § 223(a) and the term "patently
offensive" in § 223(d)(1) are unconstitutionally vague and the
"display" prohibition in § 223(d) is unconstitutionally overbroad.
The First Amendment, as the Supreme Court recently stated in
Turner Broadcasting System, "does not countenance governmental
control over the content of messages expressed by private
34. Indeed, two courts have already so found. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
Pa.), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
The three-judge panel in ACLU, in three separately-issued opinions, found that the CDA failed
strict scrutiny and was unconstitutionally overbroad, while Chief Judge Sloviter and Judge
Buckwalter agreed that the "indecency" provisions were unconstitutionally vague. The panel in
Shea rejected the vagueness challenge to the patently offensive "display" provision of § 223(d)
but upheld the plaintiff's claim that the section was unconstitutionally overbroad and thus
granted a preliminary injunction against its enforcement. For archives of materials related to
these two cases, see <httpJ/www.eff.org/publLegal/Cases/EFFACLU v_DoJ/>(last modified
Dec. 6, 1996); <http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/CasesAmReportervDoJ/>(last modified Dec.
16, 1996); <http://www.epic.org/free-speech/censorship/lawsuit/>(visited Dec. 16, 1996).
individuals."'  This is because it is fundamental to our "political
system and cultural life" that, "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment,
lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself the
ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and
adherence." a Because the indecency ban is a regulation that
"suppress[es], disadvantage[s], or impose[s] differential burdens upon
speech because of its content," it must face the "most exacting
scrutiny."'  In other words, the government can only burden
constitutionally-protected speech if it does so to promote a compelling
interest and chooses the least restrictive means to carry it out.38
This exacting scrutiny is so strict that no court has ever upheld an
indecency restriction that facially or practically banned indecency from
any medium. In Sable Communications, for example, a unanimous
Court struck down the dial-a-porn ban on telephone indecency,
even though the "most enterprising and disobedient young people"
would still manage to secure access under less restrictive
mechanisms?39 Only where adults would continue to have access to
constitutionally-protected expression have courts upheld indecency
restrictions designed to protect children.' Thus, recently in Denver
Area Consortium, a fractured Court upheld a provision that permits
private cable system operators to prohibit patently offensive material
35. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458-59 (1994)(citing, inter alia, R.A.V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
36. Id. at 2458 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 2459 (citations omitted). There is no question that the CDA is a content-based
restriction since it suppresses, indeed, criminalizes the transmission of, words or images deemed
"indecent" or "patently offensive" for minors.
38. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). The Court's most recent foray
into indecency restrictions in the telecommunications arena suggests the Court may take a more
flexible, balancing approach to such issues, deviating from the traditional strict scrutiny analysis.
See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2384
(1996)(plurality). Whether Denver Area Consortium is an aberration or represents a new
development in First Amendment jurisprudence, it will be seen below, see infra at note 44
and accompanying text; infra at note 84, that the CDA's indecency ban still must clearly fall.
39. Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31. See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
73 (1983)(striking down a ban on mail advertisements for contraceptives); Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380,383-84 (1957)(overturning a conviction for distributing indecent publications).
40. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 733 (1978)(upholding FCC's determination
that seven dirty words could not be broadcast during the afternoon since the FCC rule was not
"intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather
sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it"
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 634-35
(1968)(upholding prohibition on sale of material harmful to minors under seventeen because the
material was still available to those over seventeen).
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from being transmitted over leased access channels.4' Meanwhile, the
Court overturned two other provisions, one that required cable
operators to segregate and block such programming if they did permit
its broadcast' and a second that was very similar to the leased access
channel provision upheld but that applied to public, educational, and
governmental access channels.43 Nevertheless, the entire Court
appeared to agree that an outright ban on indecent or patently
offensive material could not pass constitutional muster."4
It remains unclear whether the government could pass the
compelling interest prong of this strict scrutiny analysis. As the Court
made clear in Sable Communications, "[s]exual expression which is
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment." 4
Although the Court also stated that it has recognized a "compelling
interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors,"'  neither the CDA nor its legislative history provides any
41. See Denver Area Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2382-90 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); id. at
2419 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part).
42. See id. at 2390-94 (majority opinion).
43. See id. at 2394-97 (Breyer, J., opinion)(distinguishing leased access channels from
public, educational, and governmental (PEG) channels by arguing that cable operators have not
historically exercised editorial control over PEG channels, that PEG programming is subject to a
complex supervisory system, that such a system ensures community choice in determining what is
valuable programming vis-A-vis a private cable operator's veto, and that the government has not
shown there is a significant enough problem to justify the restriction on patently offensive
broadcasts); id. at 2407-10, 2416-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part)(arguing
that PEG channels are designated public fora and that the government cannot satisfy the
"narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny analysis).
44. See id. at 2387 (majority opinion)(stressing the permissive nature of the leased access
channel provision upheld); id. at 2390-91 (Breyer, J., opinion)(stressing again the distinction
between the acceptable permissive provision and the unconstitutional outright requirementof the
segregate and block provision); id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring)(noting that the line
separating the constitutionality of the leased access channel provision from the
unconstitutionality of the PEG channel provision is the "difference between a permit and a
prohibition"); id. at 2401 (Souter, J., concurring)(noting that Pacifica, the case most nearly on
point, "dealt not with a flat restriction covering a separate category of indecency at the First
Amendment's periphery, but with a less than total ban, directed to instances of indecent speech
easily available to children through broadcasts readily received in the household and difficult
or impossible to control without immediate supervision"); id. at 2415, 2416-17 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(arguing that there is no justification for a "blanket rule
of lesser protection for indecent speech" and suggesting that Congress fashioned these provisions
as it did "to avoid the clear constitutional difficulties of banning indecent speech"); id. at 2423
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)(stating emphatically that
"[c]ertainly, under our current jurisprudence, Congress could not impose a total ban on the
transmission of indecent programming")(citation omitted).
45. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
46. Id.
evidence that minors would be harmed by constitutionally-protected
indecent speech.' Because the Court has objected to simply deferring
to a legislative finding when First Amendment rights are at stake,' it
should reject outright the conclusory link between indecency and
harm implicit in the CDA where the congressional record contains no
legislative findings at all.
In fact, the Court should be particularly wary since
constitutionally-protected indecent speech will comprise much
expression that is valuable, even if controversial. For example, the
CDA would ban the transmission of literature and art dealing with
sexual themes, such as Lady Chatterly's Lover, vigorous political
debate, such as that at stake in Cohen v. California.50 and public health
information dealing with sex, sex education, and AIDS. Moreover, the
CDA fails to differentiate between the seven and seventeen year-old,
lumping all minors together. While the Court may be willing to accept
Congress's unsupported view that indecency of this sort harms the
seven year-old, and thus that the government possesses a compelling
interest in its restriction, some empirical finding of such harm for the
seventeen year-old ought to be required. In any event, it is difficult to
see why the government, and not parents, should determine what is
suitable for children to view in cyberspace, especially given the
"cardinal" principle that "the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder."51
The indecency ban clearly fails the "least restrictive means" prong
of the strict scrutiny test. Although the statutory language of the CDA
bans indecency only with regard to transmission to or access by
47. It should be noted that the CDA indecency ban goes further than the prohibition
in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), where, although the literature was not obscene by
adult standards, it also did not possess any serious value. Id. at 639-40. The CDA, on the other
hand, bans "patently offensive" material, even if it possesses serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
4& See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978); Sable, 492
U.S. at 129.
49. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2471 (1994)(stating that the Court must
assure itself that "Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence"); cf.
Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(arguing that "when
trenching on [F]irst [A]mendment interests, even incidentally, the government must be able to
adduce either empirical support or at least sound reasoning on behalf of its measures").
50. 403 U.S. 15 (1971)("Fuck the Draft" emblazoned on a jacket).
51. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
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minors, the nature of the on-line medium is such that Congress has, in
effect, banned indecency from cyberspace for everyone, not just
children. Since nearly all Net users are also content providers, most
netizens are thus criminally liable for any indecent communication
they make "available" to minors. But what is "available" to minors is
nearly all expression except that in private e-mail to a known adult.
Because screening mechanisms, such as credit card verification or pre-
authorized adult access database lists, are (1) infeasible or cost-
prohibitive for all but the largest commercial content-providers52 or
(2) currently technologically impossible for certain forms of Internet
communication, such as newsgroupsj most users will be forced to
self-censor their expression to avoid the risk of criminal prosecution.
This indecency ban thus violates a stricture which the Court has
reiterated time and again: "[Tlhe government may not 'reduce the
adult population . .. to. . . only what is fit for children." '' The
Court has used a number of powerful metaphors over the years to
make this point-from not limiting adult discourse to that only
"suitable for a sandbox"-55 to not "quarantining the general reading
public . . . to shield juvenile innocence"' to not allowing the
government to "burn the house to roast the pig. ' ' However, they all
come down to the same thing: A statute is unconstitutional if it has
the "invalid effect of limiting the content of adult [speech] to that
which is suitable for children. "
58
Just as Congress failed to inquire whether indecent
communications really harm minors of all ages, it also failed to
consider whether alternative means to restrict children's access to
indecent materials even existed, let alone prove themselves potentially
more viable and less restrictive of adult speech. 9 This failure to even
52. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845-47 (E.D. Pa. 1996), probable jurisdiction
noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
53. Cf. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(finding that a "content
provider has no way of ensuring that a message posted to a newsgroup or a mailing list will not be
available to persons under the age of eighteen").
54. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73
(1983)(quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,383 (1957))).
55. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74-75 ("[tjhe level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox").
56. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
57. Id.
5& Sable, 492 U.S. at 131.
59. See 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1128-29 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CONF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
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consider alternatives cannot pass constitutional muster. In the closely
analogous Sable Communications case, the Supreme Court rejected a
total ban on indecent commercial telephone communications where
"the congressional record contain[ed] no legislative findings that
would justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally
acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the
Government's interest in protecting minors."'
With the CDA, Congress has totally failed to "demonstrate that
the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way."' Essentially, all Congress did was graft the dial-a-porn
standards onto cyberspace. 2 Chief sponsor Senator Exon simply
waved his "blue book"-filled, as he said, with the "most disgusting,
repulsive . . . most hardcore, perverse types of pornography" taken
from the Internet-on the Senate floor (and dared his colleagues "to
take a look")--a truly "spectacular" sight. Congress, however, made
no attempt to determine just what cyberspace is and how it works,
how difficult it is for minors of various ages to obtain access to this raw
pornography, whether the material of concern is obscene or merely
indecent, whether the statutory defenses are feasible, or whether there
are effective alternative defenses, not to even mention whether the
dial-a-porn standards themselves even could be grafted onto the
rootstock of cyberspace. 64
In its ignorance, Congress has approached the matter in a
thoroughly backwards way. The indecency ban will necessarily fail to
rid cyberspace of indecency-being a global internetworked
phenomenon, even a total ban must necessarily fail to alleviate the
alleged "harms in a direct and material way"---because the only
60. Sable, 492 U.S. at 129.
61. Turner Broad. Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2470.
62. See 141 CONG. REc. S8333 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)(statement of Sen. Coats).
63. Id. at S8330 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)(statement of Sen. Exon).
64. Cf. Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619,
1632 (1995)(suggesting that given the "dramatic difference between telephone technology and
interactive networks such as the Internet and other online services, we believe that the
constitutionality of dial-a-porn-type regulations for interactive media would be in serious
doubt").
65. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2470. See infra part IV. See also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
882 (E.D. Pa.)(Dalzell, J.)(finding that the "CDA will almost certainly fail to accomplish the
Government's interest in shielding children from pornography on the Internet"), prob. juris.
noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
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potentially effective ways of screening out indecency must be
implemented at the receiving end. Already a number of products exist
that act as software filters to allow parents to block content that they
find objectionable for their children. 6 The most promising approach is
the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS), developed under
the auspices of MIT's World Wide Web Consortium. The PICS
approach provides a value-neutral labeling infrastructure for sites in
cyberspace through which compatible software can block access by
using flexible, context-specific rules, not a blanket approach.67 PICS, in
effect, will create a super-sophisticated V-chip for cyberspace.
68
Although neither current software filters nor PICS will prove 100%
effective in keeping indecency from enterprising youth,69 two First
Amendment ideals are achieved by these alternative means: Speakers
will not be censored or chilled, and the responsibility for making
choices about their children's cyberspace experiences will be returned
to "where our society has traditionally placed it-on the shoulders of
the parent." 7 Indeed, it is rather remarkable, and ultimately
indefensible, that in the same piece of legislation Congress should
prescribe V-chips to block television indecency but not even consider
such parental empowerment technologies for cyberspace.1
It should also be emphatically clear that the relaxed scrutiny of
Pacifica ought not to apply in cyberspace. Although the Court has
claimed that "each medium of expression presents special First
66. See, e.g., ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838-39 (discussing "Cyber Patrol" and "SurfWatch");
Joshua Quittner, Filter Out the Naughty Bits, TIME, July 3, 1995 (discussing "SurfWatch" and
"Net Nanny").
67. See Paul Resnick & James Miller, PICS: Internet Access Controls Without Censorship,
(visited Feb. 24, 1997)<http://www.w3.orglpub/WWWPICS>; Jim Miller, Paul Resnick, & David
Singer, Rating Systems and Rating Services (and Their Machine Readable Descriptions)(visited
Feb. 24, 1997)<http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/PICS>. See also ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838-39
(discussing PICS).
68. Unlike the actual V-chip, however, PICS will not mandate that the content-provider
label her expression.
69. Total effectiveness of the alternative means is not a requirement under First
Amendment jurisprudence, see Sable, 492 U.S. at 131, nor does it appear to be so under the
CDA itself, see 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1129 (Jan. 31, 1996)(CONP. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996)(stating that a preventive measure "does not require an
absolute 100% restriction of access to be judged effective").
70. Fabulous Assoc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 788 (3rd Cir.
1990) (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 73-74).
71. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551, 110 Stat. 56, 139-42 (1996), especially § 551(a)(8) in
which Congress finds "[t]here is a compelling governmental interest in empowering parents to
limit the negative influences of video programming that is harmful to children."
Amendment problems,"'72 Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe
have shown that in actuality there are only two models, at least before
Denver Area Consortium: the relaxed broadcast model seen in
Pacifica and Red Lion Broadcasting73 on the one hand and everything
else on the other (what they term the "print model" with its standard
jurisprudence of strict scrutiny).74 Indeed, the Turner Court rejected
"the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First
Amendment scrutiny" in the context of cable regulation,75 arguably
the medium closest in characteristics to broadcast. However, in the
more recent cable case Denver Area Consortium, a plurality adopted
what it considered a more flexible approach to meet the "changes
taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial structure[]
related to telecommunications."'76 Nevertheless, five justices, who split
on the judgment, agreed that the Court's jurisprudence demanded that
cable be governed by the print paradigm.77
72. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978)(citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952)); cf. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S.
488, 496 (1986)(Blackmun, J., concurring)("Different communications media are treated
differently for First Amendment purposes.").
73. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1967).
74. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First Amendment Principles for
Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1719, 1721-22 (1995).
75. Turner Broad. Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2456. Cass Sunstein has argued that this refusal by the
Turner Court "suggests that new technologies will generally be subject to ordinary free speech
standards, not to the more lenient standards applied to broadcasting." Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1769 (1995).
76. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385
(1996)(plurality). Although not stated definitively, the standard the plurality applied amounts to
close scrutiny "to assure that [the regulation] properly addresses an extremely important
problem, without imposing, in light of relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction on
speech," id., or, alternatively, that "Government may directly regulate speech to address
extraordinary problems, where its regulations are appropriately tailored to resolve those
problems without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Id. See also id. at
2404-07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(pointing out the various
formulations of the unsettled standard the plurality applies). Whatever this standard is, it clearly
is not strict scrutiny, but nor is it the relaxed Pacifica standard. See, e.g., id. at 2391 (Breyer, J.,
opinion).
77. See, e.g., id. at 2415 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(noting that
the Court in Turner already "rejected the application of this lower broadcast standard of review
[of Pacifica] to infringements on the liberties of cable operators, even though they control an
important communications medium" and arguing that strict scrutiny should be applied); id. at
2420 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)(arguing that the
Court's jurisprudence through Turner recognizes that cable operators should enjoy similar First
Amendment protection as print media). The three-judge panel in Shea, even after analyzing the
plurality's less-than-fully-strict approach, concluded that the CDA's ban, unlike the leased access
channel provision there, nevertheless demanded strict scrutiny. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp
916,939 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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The relaxed scrutiny of broadcast regulation "rests upon the
unique physical limitations of the broadcast medium," 8 but these
characteristics are absent in cyberspace. There is no scarcity problem
since cyberspace does not require the electromagnetic spectrum:?9
Although seemingly everywhere, cyberspace is not "uniquely
pervasive" in the sense that television and radio are. One does not
tune in and out of cyberspace as one does with broadcast!s' Instead,
cyberspace is a medium that requires the user "to take affirmative
steps to receive the communication." 8' Finally, cyberspace, unlike
broadcasting, which is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read,"82 requires a degree of computer literacy that makes
finding the type of pornography and obscenity that Congress said it
was concerned with a much more difficult task than simply turning on
a television set or radio, or even the computer itself. Although I shall
argue below that even the two-fold model of communications
jurisprudence cannot survive the convergence of technologies and
media,8 it is at least clear under current First Amendment
jurisprudence that cyberspace is not like broadcast, that therefore
content-based restrictions on speech in cyberspace must pass strict
7& Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
79. Cf. id. at 2456-57 (finding that cable television does not "suffer from the inherent
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium").
80. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-49 (1978).
81. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128. In the parlance of cyberspeak, taking an
affirmative step to receive a communication is an example of "pull" technology: one must seek
out the data one wants--colloquially known as "surfing the Net"-and the user's software, or
browser, "pulls" it home. As cyberspace seeks to hone its economic viability, which can be
achieved in part by simplifying the technological interface, making the cyber-consumer's
experience more convenient and familiar, the World Wide Web is witnessing the development of
"push" technology. With this approach, customized information is "pushed" directly to a more
passive user's computer in a cyber-analogy to "broadcast." See David Bank, Inverted Web: How
Net is Becoming More Like Television To Draw Advertisers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1996, at Al.
While this is only an analogy, such a development appears to erode the strength of the argument
presented here. It is certainly true that the convergence of communications media and
technologies will likely continue to accelerate for the foreseeable future and that the tangled
Web being woven will only present more difficult questions. Such developments, however, ought
to caution restraint in our approach to any regulation. See infra note 205. Indeed, one must be
careful not to mistake the familiar for the semblance of similitude. Fundamental differences
remain between cyberspace and broadcast television, and they are likely to persist. The "pull" of
cyberspace is not going to evaporate overnight. In fact, the freedom of roaming cyberspace is
liberating in a way the "channels" of push technology can never be. That freedom ought to be
respected and protected.
82. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
83. See infra part IV.
scrutiny, and that the CDA's indecency ban fails this test.84 Judge
Dalzell, in the American Civil Liberties Union case, went so far as to
conclude that, given the "special characteristics" of the Internet,
"Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all."'
Notwithstanding the CDA's constitutional infirmity with respect
to its content-based restrictions, important provisions are
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as well. Vague laws violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment which requires that "a
penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." ' Where expressive activity is involved, the Supreme
Court has required that "[p]recision of regulation ... be the
touchstone," 87 for otherwise uncertainty will make individuals "'steer
far wider of the unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the
forbidden areas were clearly marked."'
The indecency provision of 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B) and the
patently offensive standard of § 223(d)(1) are forbidden areas not
clearly marked. Both provisions are insuffiently defined to overcome
their inherent subjectivity. As Justice Harlan has put it, "one man's
vulgarity is another's lyric."'  Moreover, there are fundamental
84. Even under the plurality's flexible approach in Denver Area Consortium, the CDA's
indecency ban must fall, for it fails to satisfy at least three of the four factors enunciated there.
First, the leased access channel provision upheld there arose "in a very particular context-
congressional permission for cable operators to regulate programming that, but for a previous
Act of Congress, would have had no path of access to cable channels free of an operator's
control." Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2386
(1996)(plurality). The CDA is a broad ban aimed at everyone, not merely one that permits
nongovernmental third parties to prohibit indecent speech for which the government previously
required them to provide communication channels. Second, as argued above, supra notes 78-82
and accompanying text, cyberspace is not a "uniquely pervasive presence" through which
indecency can enter the home with "little or no prior warning," as broadcast or cable may. Cf. id
at 2386-87 (plurality). Finally, the CDA is far from permissive, as the leased access channel
provision is. Rather, it is a total ban on indecency and patently offensive material that subjects
violators to harsh criminal penalties. Cf. id. (plurality).
85. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 877, 881 (E.D. Pa.)(Dalzell, J.)(emphasis added),
prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
86. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
87. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963).
88. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)).
89. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). "Indeed," Justice Harlan continued, "we
think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area
that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual." Id.
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disjunctions between the text of the statute and its legislative history.
Section 223(a)(1)(B) proscribes communications that are "obscene or
indecent." Thus, it is impossible to give a saving construction to this
provision by equating "indecent" with "obscene"; evidently much
more than obscenity was intended to be banned. Section 223(d)(1)
prohibits communications that depict or describe "in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual
or excretory activities or organs." Although this subsection does not
mention the term "indecent," the Conference Report states that
it "codifies the definition of indecency" from Pacifica.9 Thus,
apparently, the indecency and patently offensive standards are meant
to be identical. Under the FCC's indecency standard in Pacifica,
however, only one prong of the Miller obscenity test is implicated, and
this conflicts with the Conference Report's statement that the
standard is not intended to put "serious, literary, and artistic works" at
risk.'
Codifying the Pacifica indecency standard does not obviate
vagueness concerns. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never actually
upheld the FCC-created, broad indecency definition in Pacifica.9
90. Contrast, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
91. 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CONF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996). Although little changed, the FCC currently defines "broadcast
indecency" as "language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities or organs." In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast
Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704, 705 n.10 (1993). Cf. In re Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975).
92. 142 CONG. REC. H1078, H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CoNF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
93. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 n.2 (D.C. Cir.)(Wald, J.,
dissenting)("We note that the Supreme Court has never actually passed on the FCC's broad
definition of 'indecency.' See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39
(D.C. Cir. 1988) [ACT I] (acknowledging that in [Pacifica], the Supreme Court never specifically
addressed whether the FCC's generic definition of indecency was unconstitutionally vague, but
arguing that because the Court 'implicitly' approved the definition by relying on it, lower courts
are barred from addressing the vagueness issue on the merits)."), affd in part and rev 'd in part
sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). It is
precisely on this aspect of vagueness that a federal district court judge entered a temporary
restraining order against enforcement of the CDA. See ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL 65464, at *2-*3
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996)(Buckwalter, J.); see also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 858 (E.D.
Pa.)(Buckwalter, J.)(arguing that a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the CDA
should be issued on grounds of overbreadth and failure to satisfy strict scrutiny in addition to the
ground of the unconstitutional vagueness of the terms "indecent," "patently offensive," and "in
context"), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); but cf. id. at 868 (Dalzell, J.)(stating that no
court has ever "upheld a vagueness challenge to the meaning of 'indecency"'). Obviously,
ACT H stands as contrary authority. See also Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d
Although the Conference Report relies on Pacifica and Sable
Communications for the constitutionality of the indecency standard,9'
neither case addressed the question of the standard's vagueness. The
dial-a-porn indecency ban in Sable Communications was struck down
on First Amendment grounds; due process vagueness concerns were
irrelevant.' In Pacifica, the Court stressed the narrowness of its
holding and that it reviewed only the FCC's authority "to proscribe
this particular broadcast."'  Pacifica was limited to its facts-seven
dirty words broadcast in the middle of the afternoon-and the unique
characteristics of the broadcast medium97; the Court did not address
the general legitimacy of the indecency standard.' Thus to say that
Pacifica indecency is meant in the CDA does not salvage those
provisions from vagueness.
Furthermore, the standard's reference to "contemporary
community standards" exacerbates, not ameliorates, the vagueness of
the CDA. The statutory language states that the patent offensiveness
must be considered "in context," 99 while the Conference Report
explicitly ties the community standard to the cyberspace medium.'W
But what are contemporary community standards in the context of
cyberspace? Because no one yet knows, ordinary people will be left to
guess while the most aggressive prosecutor in the least tolerant
community may go after just about anything in cyberspace, thus
imperiling both aspects of vagueness concerns under the Due Process
Clause.101 Given the multiple levels on which the CDA is vague,
866, 874 (9th Cir. 1991)(rejecting a vagueness challenge to the term "indecent" in the dial-a-porn
context); Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991)(same).
94. See 142 CONG. REc. H1078, H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CoNF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
95. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
96. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,742,750 (1978)(emphasis added).
97. See id. at 748-50; Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
9& See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742-43. In fact, the Court explicitly declined to address the
overbreadth argument. Id.
99. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B) (West 1996).
100. See 142 CONG. REc. H1078, H1129 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996)(CONF. REP. on S. 652,
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
101. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)(two-fold vagueness concerns); see
also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)(same). Cf. United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711-12 (6th Cir. 1996)(construing facts of case narrowly to find that a new
definition of community in cyberspace was not necessary where adult bulletin board operators
had knowledge and control over the jurisdictions into which their materials were electronically
sent).
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ordinary users of cyberspace will be forced to self-censor in order to
steer much further of the unlawful zone than due process can bear.'
The CDA is unconstitutional in at least one other way': it is
fatally overbroad, especially in § 223(d)(1)'s "display" prohibition.'
The Act simply sweeps in too much speech that is constitutionally
protected for both adults and certain minors. 105 Indeed, all indecent
speech is protected for adults. It is the nature of the cyberspace
medium that causes this particular ban to sweep this protected speech
away from adults.' 6 Because the CDA reaches so much
constitutionally-protected speech, the Act's regular application to
cyberspace communications will, perforce, affect protected speech.
Therefore, the CDA is, a fortiori, facially overbroad.1' 7 Moreover, the
CDA is overbroad in that it fails to account for distinctions among
minors of various ages. Just as the Act levels speech available to adults
down to what is suitable for children, it similarly bans speech
appropriate for high school seniors by grinding down suitability to the
first grade level.' ° Neither is constitutionally justifiable.
Despite all the ink spent to this point on traditional legal analysis,
the CDA's indecency ban is so patently unconstitutional that its
passage is laughable in a detached, postmodern sort of way. Already
thousands of content-providers have participated in a Blue Ribbon
Campaign against Internet censorship; more than 40,000 netizens
joined as plaintiffs in the American Library Association suit1'; and
102 See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,371-72 (1964)(citation omitted).
103. This essay does not examine other possible challenges to the CDA, such as vagueness of
the statutory defenses or the ability of other current laws to proscribe obscenity and child
pornography in cyberspace. See, however, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 869 (E.D.
Pa.)(Buckwalter, J.)(finding the statutory defenses unconstitutionally vague), prob. juris. noted,
117 S. Ct. 554 (1996).
104. It is on this basis that the Shea panel struck down § 223(d). See Shea v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916,922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
105. See M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1983)(stating that
constitutional infirmity of overbroad legislation "is that it sweeps protected activity within its
proscription").
106. See generally supra text following note 51 and accompanying notes 52-58.
107. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,467 (1987).
108. At least in the context of "harmful to minors" statutes, courts will not ban material for
all minors just because it is harmful to younger ones. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1990)(concluding, in construing a Georgia statute that
did not distinguish among age groups, that "if any reasonable minor, including a seventeen-year-
old, would find serious value' in the work, then the material was not harmful to minors), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 942 (1991).
109. For current and archived information, see Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition
<http://www.cdt.org/ciec>(last modified Feb. 20, 1997).
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hackers, in protest over the CDA, rewrote the Department of Justice's
homepage to include a so-called indecent image of a partially-clad
celebrity and links to sites criticizing presidential candidates."
Cyberspace really does appear to be a fundamentally different sort of
entity, one of which Congress evidently does not have even the
foggiest conception. Yet this is only one manifestation of the indecent
indecency spectacle.
III
Why the Television Ratings Provisions Are Unconstitutional
Unlike the indecency ban, which is being heavily litigated, the
television industry has already backtracked on its threats to challenge
the constitutionality of the television ratings provisions, buying with its
acquiescence what could be $70 billion worth of spectrum for
advanced digital television."' Both because the television ratings
provisions are unlikely to be litigated anytime soon and because so
much is uncertain about how the actual system will be implemented, it
currently suffices to suggest some of the ways in which the ratings
provisions may be unconstitutional. 12
The program ratings envisioned by the CDA are content-based
restrictions. There is no question here about unconstitutionally-
protected obscene speech; the ratings are to be applied to "sexual,
violent, or other indecent material,'113 all of which is constitutionally
protected. Moreover, because there is no statutory distinction between
gratuitous sex and violence, which are arguably unnecessary to the
message, it cannot be claimed here that the law, in restricting only
110. See Hackers Penetrate Justice Dept. Home Page, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1996, at A22.
111. See supra note 11.
112. As this essay was going to press, the television industry's development of a ratings
scheme was being announced. The plan proposes age-based ratings vis-a-vis content-based
ratings in a fashion that is directly analogous to the current Motion Picture Association of
America film ratings. It has already drawn the ire of many. As a result, industry talk of litigating
"our First Amendment rights" has resurfaced should the plan be rejected and a government
rating system be imposed in accordance with the CDA. See Kyle Pope, TV-Rating Plan Is
Unveiled Amid Criticism, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1996, at B6.
113. 47 U.S.C.A. § 303(w)(1) (West 1996). Although nowhere mentioned in the statute or its
legislative history, it will be assumed for the purposes of this discussion that "indecent" here
means the same thing it is said to mean in 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1), viz. the Pacifica indecency
standard. See supra note 91. This reading is problematic in that the statute already specifically
takes aim at "sexual" material. Obviously this ambiguity is one potential ground to challenge the
provision as void for vagueness.
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gratuitous sex and violence, is a "manner" regulation.14 Furthermore,
if television sex and violence harm at all, then those harms must be the
result of the communicative expression; hence, Renton's secondary-
effects doctrine does not apply.- Therefore, the ratings provisions are
subject to strict scrutiny." 6 It will do no good to say that the television
industry "voluntarily" adopted its ratings system when the statute
plainly threatens that the government will appoint its own ratings
advisory committee should private industry fail," 7 thereby implicating
the First Amendment."8
Although it may be possible to design a ratings scheme that is
content-neutral, Congress has not done so here. And while it may
seem that under a ratings scheme the television user retains all choice,
it is really Big Brother deciding what those ratings are. As things now
stand, that Big Brother is the video programming/entertainment
114. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). See
also Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1487,1502 (1995).
115. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); see also Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)(stating that "[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of
'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton").
116. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)("The government
may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally-protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.").
117. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(e)(1)(A), (B), 110 Stat. 56, 142 (1996). In fact, only one
year is given for industry to "voluntarily" gear up this huge effort. Indeed, as Robert Corn-
Revere has sardonically observed, "To call such a system 'voluntary' is to redefine the word. It is
voluntary only in the sense that walking the plank at sword point is voluntary. Such a plan could
only have been hatched in Washington, D.C., where the federal tax system is often described as
voluntary." Robert Corn-Revere, V-Chipping Away at the Constitution, WASH. PosT, July 28,
1995, at A27.
118. Even if a ratings scheme is seen as merely a labeling requirement, the restriction still
amounts to a content-based regulation demanding strict scrutiny. Because 47 U.S.C. § 303(w)(2)
requires that any rating be transmitted, not only is the content of the video programmer's speech
changed, since it has been added to, but the character of that speech is essentially transformed.
Thus, the principles both of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974),
that telling "publishers to publish that which reason tells them should not be published" is
inherently contrary to the First Amendment, and of Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 795 (1988), that "[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make
necessarily alters the content of the speech" and thus makes the mandate a content-based
regulation, are violated. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987), is not to the contrary, for there the
required label was explicitly found not to be pejorative, the label could be removed by the
recipient, and the Department of Justice made no public pronouncement that the material was
"political propaganda." Id. at 471, 479 n.14, 483-85. The whole point of rating "sexual, violent, or
other indecent material," and requiring transmission of that rating, is that the rating/label
attached is not neutral. Cf. Edwards & Berman, supra note 114, at 1510 (arguing that
"governmentally required labeling or violence disclosure [provokes] content-based First
Amendment scrutiny").
industry, with even Bigger Government standing right behind it,
breathing down its neck, and counting to ...one year. Because the
government is requiring that any ratings scheme specifically rate
programming for sexual, violent, or other indecent content,
programming speech containing such content is thereby disadvantaged
and the regulation is content-based, requiring strict scrutiny.119
The strict scrutiny analysis, however, may be complicated by the
fact that some of the video programming to be rated will be broadcast
over VHF and UHF stations, thus raising the possibility of the relaxed
scrutiny traditionally applied to this medium.' Since the Act
contemplates no difference in the delivery method of video
programming, this bifurcated approach to First Amendment issues in
communications law will face another reason to be scrapped. It will
simply be too much to strap on to the Pacifica rationale, concerned as
it was with indecency in a uniquely pervasive medium uniquely
accessible to children, 1 all the same attributes for violence, not only
in the broadcast medium, but also in cable, DBS, and potentially other
video delivery systems. Pacifica, therefore, should be limited to its
facts once and for all and consigned to its dustbin.
Under strict scrutiny, the ratings provisions will fare much better
than the CDA's indecency ban, for in this case Congress at least made
an attempt to provide legislative findings as to the government's
compelling interest in protecting children from potentially harmful
video programming.' Actually, to be more precise, Congress
expressed findings as to how children were adversely affected by
violent and sexual programming content and then merely stated that
"[t]here is a compelling governmental interest in empowering parents
to limit the negative influences of video programming that is harmful
to children."'  Nevertheless, courts will not just simply defer to these
119. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2461 (1994)(recognizing that "even a
regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its manifest purpose is to regulate speech
because of the message it conveys"). Edwards and Berman suggest that a ratings-blocking system
ought to be content-neutral on its face, but they acknowledge that "[tihe regulation will raise
problems only if the government ordains the program characteristics upon which a lockout
mechanism could operate." Edwards & Berman, supra note 114, at 1515. (Un)fortunately, sex,
violence, and other indecency are the "program characteristics" that the V-chip will block out.
120. Or, at least perhaps, the new flexible approach adopted by the plurality in Denver Area
Consortium. See generally supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
121. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-50 (1978).
122. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(a), 110 Stat. 56, 139-40(1996).
123. Id. at § 551(a)(8), 110 Stat. at 140.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT LJ. [VOL. 19:87
1996] COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND THE INDECENT INDECENCY SPECTACLE 111
findings where First Amendment rights are at stake,' 4 as well they
should not here, as these findings remain largely conclusory, especially
with regard to harm caused by sexual material, and there is no
mention of the effect of indecent programming at all. While the
government may be able to make a strong case that television violence
actually causes aggressive behavior, ' the causal effects of television
sex are much more tenuous. But as Judge Harry Edwards and Mitchell
Berman pointedly note, when it comes to "the compelling interest
prong of exacting scrutiny," the real question is not "whether
television violence causes societal violence, but how much"-and
there is scant data on that question.'6
Moreover, although Congress "found" that ratings and the V-chip
are "narrowly tailored means"'  to effectuate government's
compelling interest, there is no showing that these mechanisms
actually satisfy Sable Communications's "least restrictive means"
prong.' Just as Congress ignored receiver-based strategies in the
CDA's indecency ban, it has done so here as well. For example,
channel lockboxes for cable television, built-in channel guards that can
block designated channels for designated times, and new commercial
products, such as The TeleCommander and TV Guardian, that allow
parents to affirmatively choose what their children can watch12 are all
currently available receiver-based mechanisms that empower parents
to monitor and control their children's television viewing habits
without any government involvement whatsoever. Thus, even if the
government's claimed compelling interest is not to protect children
124. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978);
Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989).
125. Cf Edwards & Berman, supra note 114, at 1535-45 (analyzing the social science data
and concluding that the consensus among social psychologists is that television violence does
cause viewers to behave aggressively).
126. Id. at 1549. Obviously, the point can be made even more strongly with regard to
television sex.
127. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(a)(9), 110 Stat. 56, 140 (1996).
12& Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. The Court has shifted between the "narrowly tailored" and "least
restrictive means" language. In any event, this prong requires that the regulation be precisely
drawn, i.e., that it not restrict more speech than necessary to achieve its end, see, e.g., Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988), and that it be the least burdensome, affecting protected speech
no more than necessary, see, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105 (1979).
129. See Why Does the ACLU Oppose the V-Chip Legislation Currently Pending in
Congress? (visited Oct. 21, 1996) <http./www.aclu.org/libray/aavchip.html>.
but to empower parents, the regulation fails the least restrictive means
prong. °
Much more problematic than even these traditional First
Amendment challenges, the ratings provisions face severe due process
vagueness concerns. In Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, the Supreme
Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a local ordinance
authorizing the classification of certain films as "not suitable for young
persons" if they describe or portray "brutality, criminal violence or
depravity ...or sexual promiscuity or extra-marital or abnormal
sexual relations in such a manner as to be ... likely to incite or
encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young
persons or to appeal to their prurient interest. ' ' " In fact, the Court
went on to specifically state:
Nor is it an answer to an argument that a particular regulation of
expression is vague to say that it was adopted for the salutary
purpose of protecting children. The permissible extent of vagueness
is not directly proportional to, or a function of, the extent of the
power to regulate or control expression with respect to children.
1 2
In following Interstate Circuit, the Eighth Circuit recently invalidated a
Missouri ban on the distribution of violent videotapes to minors partly
on the ground that the term "violence" was unconstitutionally
vague.m
These cases strongly suggest the CDA will fail for vagueness. And
the questions that must be raised seem nearly endless: How will
violence be defined? Will there be distinctions between gratuitous
violence, violence that is necessary for law enforcement, and violence
that is always followed by punishment? Where will the lines be drawn?
How will live events be rated (consider the assassination of Lee
Harvey Oswald and the Challenger disaster)? What about sports-golf
vs. football vs. boxing? How will newscasts be rated (consider the
repeated showings of the Rodney King and Reginald Denny
beatings)? News magazines? News talk shows and public affairs
programming? Tabloid news shows? Afternoon talk shows? Again,
where will the lines be drawn? Will series be rated, or individual
130. It is worth noting that underlying the entire V-chip legislation is an assumption of
effective parental supervision, a notion that one commentator has plainly termed "an upper-
middle-class conceit." Elizabeth Kolbert, Entertainment Values vs. Social Concerns in TV-
Violence Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,1993, at C13 (quoting George Gerbner).
131. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 681 (1968).
13Z Id. at 689.
133. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684,689-90 (8th Cir. 1992).
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episodes? What about cartoons where there is not even the illusion of
a real person being harmed? What about commercials for Friday the
Thirteenth Part X and Terminator Y? And what of all the
programming that was produced before the ratings system is in place?
(And we have not even gotten to questions of vagueness concerning
sexual and other indecent material yet.) Furthermore, it seems highly
unlikely that the censors will ever be able to distinguish between
harmful and harmless sexual, violent, or other indecent video material,
dooming any attempts to so distinguish as void for vagueness.'
4
Yet even if the censors can provide a constitutionally acceptable
definition of violence and answers to these other questions, it is still
not clear why the First Amendment does not forbid such direct
censorship. As the Seventh Circuit unabashedly commented in
American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut. "[V]iolence on
television . . . is protected speech, however invidious. Any other
answer leaves the government in control of all of the institutions of
culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are good for
us."' Indeed, Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe have observed
that "[t]he Supreme Court has exhibited little tolerance for censorship
that rests on the view that the censored speech is likely to cause others
to engage in antisocial behavior." 3 Courts have repeatedly held that
the First Amendment protects depictions of violence in books and
films from government interference.1
It must be taken seriously that advertisers will fear association
with certain ratings, that censors will err on the side of caution, and
that producers will accordingly self-censor their expression. These
effects amount to a ban on televised violence, which, if justified on the
grounds that reducing minors' exposure to violence will reduce real
134. Cf. Edwards & Berman, supra note 114, at 1565 ("When it comes to televised
violence, we cannot imagine how regulators can distinguish between harmless and harmful
violent speech, and we can find no proposal that overcomes the lack of supporting data.").
135. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), affd
ment., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
136. THOMAS 0. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. PowE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 133 (1994).
137. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992);
Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199,204-06 (S.D. Fla. 1979); see also Why Does the
ACLU Oppose the V.Chip Legislation Currently Pending in Congress?, supra note 129. Cf.
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)(reversing conviction for possession of certain
violent detective stories and stating that "[t]hough we can see nothing of any possible value to
society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best
of literature" (emphasis added)).
violence, will run afoul of the principle in Brandenburg- "[T]he
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
[the] State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action."' Moreover, a ban on televised violence, as well as bans
on sexual and other indecent material, will be constitutionally infirm if
they serve to level televised expression to what is only fit for children,
just as the CDA's cyberspace indecency ban is similarly infirm.' 9 And,
of course, where the ratings provisions, and the bans they effect, leave
the current safe harbor for the broadcast of (unrated) indecency is also
problematic.'
It is interesting that the provisions mandating the public hook
in the CDA, its cultural moniker-the V-chip itself "--are content
neutral and unproblematic. The problems arise in the implementation
of the ratings scheme 42 and in requiring the transmission of any
ratings.'43 And, of course, these First Amendment problems are not
obviated by leaving the details to be worked out by the FCC.'
138. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Indeed, it appears to be the nearly
universal conclusion of courts and commentators that televised violence fails the incitement
element of Brandenburg. See Edwards & Berman, supra note 114, at 1526; see also
KRATrENMAKER & PowE, supra note 136, at 134.
139. See, e.g, Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983)(quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957))).
140. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)(en
banc) (supporting the government's particularized regulation of broadcasts in order to protect
children), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). Indeed, it must be questioned why the time-
channeling of violent and indecent programming isn't less burdensome than the CDA's scheme.
Should a ratings scheme go into effect, difficult questions concerning unrated programming
will clearly arise, especially if unrated programming is channeled into a late night safe harbor. In
fact, if unrated programming (recall that the CDA does not mandate that any particular program
be rated) be forced into a safe harbor, this would amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint.
See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963)(striking down a system of prior administrative restraints).
141. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303(x), 330(c) (West 1996).
142. The apparent "voluntariness" of even rating programs once the ratings scheme has been
adopted (either "voluntarily" or not) also does not save the provision, for that aspect raises
additional questions about whether the government can satisfy the compelling interest prong of
the strict scrutiny analysis.
143. Cf Edwards & Berman, supra note 114, at 1566 (suggesting that the safest course for
Congress would be "to enact a regulation that neither requires 'transmission' of ratings nor
imposes any specific ratings categories").
144. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505,1513 n.19 (1993).
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Congress could conceivably create a statute regulating television
violence and sex that does not run afoul of the Constitution. But the
CDA is not that statute. In fact, rewrites will largely prove futile, for
once television is subsumed into cyberspace, our postmodern cultural
urges will not be regulable under traditional schema.
IV
Cyberspace as Postmodern Spectacle
I shall argue presently that whether one is convinced by the legal
arguments marshalled in the preceding two sections will ultimately
prove to be irrelevant. Cyberspace is a new creature, yet it is one that
is not unexpected (which is not to say predictable), being a natural and
logical outgrowth of our contemporary condition. As such, I borrow
from critiques developed by scholars of contemporary cultural studies
to show that cyberspace is simply not regulable as other media have
been in the past.
One critique describes our current cultural condition with the
now-familiar term "postmodern."'45 This postmodernity reflects,
among other things, a world that is affectless and concerned with the
superficial. Representation and simulation are elevated to the fore of
consciousness, both individually and collectively, such that any other
reality becomes questionable. A second critique focuses on the
spectacular nature of our media-driven society.'6 On this view, too,
images-cum-spectacles mediate reality. Both critiques see our
obsession with image and images as part of the natural evolution of
our capitalistic economy. In this final section, then, I conjoin these
critiques to argue that cyberspace is the quintessential postmodern
spectacle and to suggest what this means for First Amendment
jurisprudence. Congress will be unable to restrain, through the CDA
or other such bans, deep cultural urges that are nurtured by the very
being of postmodern capitalism. Moreover, serious attempts to do so
will undermine respect for the rule of law. Nevertheless, our society is
such that the image of future indecency spectacles is one with which
we will all have to live.
145. See, in particular, infra notes153-156 and accompanying text.
146. See generally infra notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
A. The Spectacular Nature of Postmodernity
The French Situationist Guy Debord's prescient observation of
the spectacular nature of the life of our society goes far towards
explaining our current fascination with the Internet and cyberspace.
Indeed, that very life itself is no longer directly lived but is mere
representation. 147 Reality therefore presents itself as a precession of
simulacra in which historical, political, and cultural facts and events
can exist only on some plane of hyperspace, emptied of all meaning.' 8
These images and simulations of reality are mediated by the mass
media into consumer goods. Whatever precisely may be expressed by
grasping postmodernism as a cultural dominant, to use Fredric
Jameson's notion, 149 the transformed marketplace of ideas-cum-
images amounts to at least this: Commodity and spectacle are two
sides of the same (debased) coin, and the ultimate cultural logic of late
capitalism is consumption reified.
The doubtful need only consider that ours is a world in which
actual wars are staged as spectacles'--this is how far that logic has
already gone. Fortunately for us, the consumers of such spectacles, the
energy of the event is dissipated by the cold, anesthetizing radiation of
television. Death and destruction are peddled like any other goods,
and we can bear to purchase them-and not bear not to purchase
them-only because of their hyperreal packaging and distribution. As
Laurie Anderson, the performance-artist-packaged-as-commercial-
pop-artist has put it: "You know, I'd rather see this on tv-tones it
down."'15
To be clear about the terms, the basis of late capitalism is not
simply the expansion of bureaucratization, the development of
multinational corporations, or the emergence of postindustrial society.
It is all of these and more: the international division of labor,
including the flight of production to the Third World; the globalization
147. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 1.
148. Cf. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, The Precession of Simulacra, in SIMULATIONS (Paul Foss and
Paul Patton trans., 1983) with JEAN BAUDRILLARD, Hot Painting: The Inevitable Fate of the Image,
in RECONSTRUCTING MODERNISM: ART IN NEW YORK, PARIS, AND MONTREAL 1945-1964, at 19
(Serge Guilbaut ed., 1990)(hereinafter Image).
149. FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL Looic OF LATE CAPITALISM 4
(1991).
150. See Joseph F. Keppler, The News as a Post-Literary Spectacle, 28 VISIBLE LANGUAGE 162
(Spring 1994)(discussing Persian Gulf War); a.h.s. boy, Biding Spectacular Time, q 3
(visited Feb. 24, 1997)<http://www.nothingness.org/SI/simisc/biding.html>(originally published in
6 POSTMODERN CULTURE (January 1996)(same)).
151. LAURIE ANDERSON, Sharkey's Day, on MISTER HEARTBREAK (WEA/Warner Bros. 1984).
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of banking and capital markets, especially the instantaneous transfer
and exchange of foreign currencies; computerization, miniaturization,
and automation; and the commodification of culture itself.
Fundamentally, it is a world criss-crossed by the wireline and wireless,
by a multinational mass media, by an international communications
industry formed of transnational corporations and strategic global
alliances whose electronic arms embrace the telecommunications,
computer, information, and entertainment sectors with one principal
goal: to produce simulations of reality, images that consume nearly all
time outside the production process; in short, spectacles. '
Postmodernity is a hegemonic norm characterized by a concern
with surfaces and the superficial, by an unliberating waning of affect,
by a loss of meaning, by the end of history. m Ours is a culture of
hyperbole, hyperspace, and hyperreality. As Jean Baudrillard has
explained, the power of the media to diffuse its images endows every
fact, every feature, be it historical, political, or cultural
with a kinetic energy that thrusts it permanently out of the space
proper to it and propels it into a hyperspace where, since it will
never return, it loses all its meaning. There is no need to create
science fiction: it exists, here and now, in our societies, with the
media, the computer data, the circuits, the networks-particle
accelerators that have destroyed the referential orbit of objects once
and for all.IM
152. Cf. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 6. The spectacular nature of contemporary reality is
well exemplified by the Olympic Games experienced most recently in 1996. Here spectacle is
produced and consumed on the grandest scale. Network television packages each event to
generate a drama about the athletes' hardships and adversities in order to build viewer
excitement about the unpredictable outcome of a contest. It then punctuates its story with the
event itself. However, due to the simultaneity of actual events and the inconvenience of prime-
time, it does so by blurring real-time through seamlessly interweaving, without any indication to
the viewer, live and taped footage. Tension is purportedly created by commercial
"interruptions." One goal of this calculated strategy is to attract certain highly desirable
demographic groups of viewers. The ultimate goal, of course, is to generate the highest ratings
possible for those advertising dollars. In truth, it is the spectacle itself that both interrupts and
nurtures the commercial enterprise of selling and promoting consumerism. The result is that a
nation, gripped in the nationalistic fervor of the spectacle, is made to consume a shared
simulation of reality, conjoined images of manufactured athletic product and consumer desire.
The artificiality and tackiness of the wedding of Olympic spectacle and raw capitalism was so
overwhelming in Atlanta that even the leisure class that comprises the International Olympic
Committee could not stomach it. See, e.g., John Helyar, A. Craig Copetas, & Roger Thurow,
Rings of Gold: Commercial Clutter Irks Olympic Leaders, Who Vow Big Changes, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 2, 1996, at Al.
153. Cf. JAMESON, supra note 149, 1-54 passim.
154. BAUDRILLARD, Image, supra note 148, at 19.
Our world has spun out of control, events have attained an escape
velocity and can no longer be held together by history. On the other
hand, the accretion of mass to the silent majority has made our world
dense and cold, so dense and cold that nothing can escape its pull and
time itself has slowed. History and meaning can no longer jump-start
or boot-strap themselves. For Baudrillard, the cold media have also
played the principal role in making our world cold, affectless, dead:
Television is creating a telefission of reality and the real world. It
radiates and innervates the entire world via a network of cold
images, images chilled by electronic distance .... [T]elevision is a
catastrophe in slow motion, a cold catastrophe exuded over time,
within minds. . . . [I]t chills and neutralizes all the meaning and
energy of events. M
Postmodern society qua spectacular media society seems less
concerned with its technologies of domination-of space and time-
than with the development of information, the construction of the
world as a set of images, and the consumption of both. But this world
is more than merely a collection of images, it is "a social relationship
between people that is mediated by images."'' The principal tools of
this mediation are the television and the computer, both consumer
objects that mediate through flat surfaces, projecting second-order
simulations. Just as much social discourse is defined by television's
diffuse dissemination of pop culture, so too we now speak of the
cyberspace community, one that is particularly "hip." But make no
mistake, the passive couch potato and the interactive cybersurfer are
no different: both have abjured real life for one of simulation, both
"spend" their "free" time consuming and consumed by images.
Indeed, it is important to recognize that, despite their apparent
differences currently, television and the computer's cyberspace are
phenomenologically equivalent, as they will soon be technologically.
B. The Import of Convergence
The convergence of communications technologies and media is
part of the natural evolution of late capitalism. Recognition of this
inevitable convergence is part of what lay behind the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The growth of cyberspace has
been fueled by the development of graphical and now multimedia
capabilities on the one hand, and, on the other, by its
155. Id. at 25.
156. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 4.
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commercialization, the belief that cyberspace represents a vast market
in which commerce and consumerism will flourish. Already the
Rolling Stones have "broadcast" a live concert over the Internet."
Soon Microsoft and NBC could begin streaming real-time video
programming over the Internet, simultaneous with its "broadcast"
over their new cable news network, MSNBC.1 In other words, the
experience of cyberspace is becoming ever more like television, with
the important proviso that one can talk back, i.e., the consumer can
immediately demand what he has been made to desire.' 9 And just like
on television, content appears to be "free," but the cost is a constant
bombardment of advertisements; indeed, it could be said that the cost
is selling oneself to the advertisers. Even here cyberspace represents a
more sophisticated version of the manufacture of desire, for software
can track the consumer's interests and target the advertising
accordingly. Thus the consumer sees not just any advertisement, but
one for a commodity he has already indicated an inclination to
desire.1
60
The convergence of television and computer is at hand,161 and
soon, perhaps within a decade, information and entertainment
delivery, be it by broadcast, cable, DBS, or other delivery system, will
be synonymous with what is now called cyberspace. 162 The same
157. See Jared Sandberg, Wild Horses Couldn't Drag Mick's On-Line Fans From This
Concert, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1994, at B1.
15& See Jane Hall, Company Town MSNBC Goes on the Air and Over the Web Media, L.A.
TIMES, Jul. 16, 1996, at D6; New Microsoft-NBC Cable Network Plans Daily Digital Show, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 17, 1996, at B9.
159. The PointCast network is a good example. Customized advertisements are "pushed" to
consumers over selected "channels" in a cyber-hybrid of "broadcast" that is modeled on the
familiarity of television. See supra note 81; Bank, supra note 81; PointCast, Inc.-Front Door
(visited Dec. 19, 1996) <http://www.pointcast.com/>. Unlike on current television, however, the
consumer can click on the ad and be taken to the advertiser's website, where often the consumer
may proceed to purchase the advertised good.
160. Netscape's Cookies, which resides on the user's hard disk (generally unbeknownst to
the user), is an early version of this type of software, software that will assuredly become more
sophisticated very quickly. See Joan E. Rigdon, Internet Users Say They'd Rather Not Share Their
"Cookies," WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,1996, at B6.
161. See G. Christian Hill & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, When a TV Joins a PC, Will Anybody
Be Watching?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1996, at B1 (reporting on the development of Web TV).
162. Indeed, cyberspace is so fluid, and convergence occurring so quickly, that any
predictions are hazardous. This essay can do no more than present a snapshot at a particular
moment in time. Unfortunately, from the time this essay was initially drafted in March and April
1996 until it went to press in December, tremendous changes have occurred, and it has been
difficult to pin down that snapshot. Nevertheless, the state of convergence is well-illustrated by
the stories on a single page of the Wall Street Journal near the end of 1996: See Don Clark,
Microsoft's On-Line Service Goes To a TV Format, WALL ST. J, Dec. 9, 1996, at B7 (discussing
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content will likely be available over multiple delivery channels, all of
which systems will combine wireline and wireless (read spectrum)
transmission hardware, whatever be the final leg to the consumer. In
this cyberrealm, the Supreme Court's artificial distinction between
different communications media for First Amendment purposes1" will
literally be meaningless. Because spectrum scarcity will scarcely be an
issue, the relaxed jurisprudence for the broadcast medium is an
inappropriate model. The unity of cyberspace demands a unitary First
Amendment jurisprudence, and there is no principled reason why
cyberspace does not deserve the full protections accorded to
newspapers, books, and films. The Supreme Court's current bifurcated
approach cannot withstand scrutiny in light of the convergence of
communications technologies and media.1"
Nor can the CDA survive even a cursory scrutiny in light of this
convergence. While the CDA appears to recognize the connection
between cyberspace and television by linking its censorship provisions
in the same Act, it fails to recognize the implications of this link. In the
cyberrealm of converged media, the indecency ban and the television
ratings provisions are fundamentally contradictory. What does it mean
to say, and how can it be, that sexual and other indecent video
programming can be made available via broadcast or cable through
the television ratings provisions' but be made a criminal offense if
the repackaging of Microsoft Network as a more passive, television-like experience in which
there will be "shows" on "channels"); cf. Bank, supra note 81; Telecom Finland to Unveil Phone
Service for Internet, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at B7 (discussing the first introduction of Internet
telephony by a traditional phone company and exhibiting, in part, the global character of
cyberspace); Intel and Microsoft To Sell Video Phones For Use On Interne4 WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,
1996, at B7 (discussing the introduction of standardized video phones for Internet telephony; in
other words, televisual communications devices for cyberspace).
163. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
164. Some members of the Court clearly appreciate the momentous changes taking place in
the telecommunications arena, although to what end for First Amendment jurisprudence is far
from clear. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2385
(1996)(plurality)(stating that "we are [aware] of the changes taking place in the law, the
technology, and the industrial structure[] related to telecommunications"); id. at 2402 (Souter, J.,
concurring)(remarking that "as broadcast, cable, and the cyber-technology of the Internet and
the World Wide Web approach the day of using a common receiver, we can hardly assume that
standards for judging the regulation of one of them will not have immense, but now unknown
and unknowable, effects on the others" (footnote omitted)).
165. Whether rated or unrated, the new 47 U.S.C. § 303(w) does not proscribe sexual,
violent, or other indecent material, nor does its implementing statute, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551,
110 Stat. 56, 139-42 (Telecommunications Act of 1996)(1996t Notwithstanding the
difficulties surrounding the interplay of television ratings and time-channeling, see supra note
140, even time-channeling is not to the contrary, permitting the availability of indecent
programming.
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that exact video programming is simultaneously streamed through
cyberspace and "displayed" to a minor over a Web TV?' 6 What it
means is that Congress fails to understand the nature of cyberspace
being created through the convergence of the very technologies it was
allegedly promoting, as well as the necessary logical implications of its
censoring actions. Surely any court that grasps the concept of
convergence will strike down the indecency ban posthaste since it is
already settled that Congress may not constitutionally impose a total
ban on indecent video programming even in the relaxed broadcast
context.'
A much more important realization is that the CDA, in both its
indecency and television ratings aspects, and any similar forms of
censorship are simply unenforceable. Even Internet pioneer John
Gilmore's well-known aphorism--"[t]he Net interprets censorship as
damage and routes around it"'k-fails to capture the essential
character of cyberspace's implacable resistance to censorship.
Understood as part of the global internetworked communications
industry whose goal is the production of images as the final form of
commodity reification, the information economy will, perforce, create
a digital self-portrait. Cyberspace is that self-portrait,1" capable of
reflecting only the postmodern culture that created it. It is not as if
cyberspace has been accreted onto the real world; rather, it
fundamentally expresses postmodern society's hyperreal condition.
Cyberspace is thus the ultimate spectacle of late capitalism. As
spectacle, it "epitomizes the prevailing model of social life," whether
manifested as "news or propaganda, advertising or the actual
consumption of entertainment."1" As Debord makes clear, this
spectacle "is the omnipresent celebration of a choice already made in
the sphere of production, and the consummate result of that choice. In
form as in content the spectacle serves as total justification for the
conditions and aims of the existing system."' ' To seek to censor
166. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (West 1996).
167. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1509 (D.C. Cir.
1991)(ACT II).
168. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TiME, July 3, 1995, at 38
(quoting Gilmore).
169. See Greg Van Alstyne, Cyberspace and the Lonely Crowd (last modified Feb. 16, 1996)
<http://www.users.interport.net/-vanski/lonelyscrowd.html> (originally published in SPAN at 35
(No. 2, 1994)).
170. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 6.
171. Id. (emphasis in original).
materials that are merely one manifestation of the cyber-spectacle is
like asking a man to cut off a limb.
The unenforceability of the CDA's censorship provisions is
apparent both as a practical matter of the global cyberspatial economy
and as lack of will that is really an affirmative desire by spectacular
society for the very images to be denied. Practically speaking, even a
total ban on violence, sex, and indecency in the United States will fail,
for cyberspace does not recognize national borders. Through the use
of successive anonymous re-mailers and encryption technology, the
source of any image, no matter how obscene, can be made impossible
to find. With the advent of anonymous digital cash, transactions
involving even the most perverse obscenity and child pornography will
be utterly untraceable. Should the United States find the will and
resources and develop effective technology to pursue a policy of zero-
tolerance-all of which is doubtful-not all countries will feel the
same way. Any native indecency industry will simply move offshore.
Where there is a market, the insatiable demand will be fulfilled.
Already the Seychelles offers protection from extradition and from
seizure of assets to anyone who invests $10 million in the country. 172 It
is not difficult to imagine a country offering physical shelter to
network servers filled with digital pornography.
At least in this regard, cyberspace as postmodern spectacle is an
entirely new entity. "As the perfect image of the ruling economic
order, ends are nothing" to it and "development is all-although the
only thing into which the spectacle plans to develop is itself." 1 3 It is
simply not possible to regulate the cyber-spectacle in any ordinary or
traditional way. Writing at the same time as Debord, nearly thirty
years ago, Umberto Eco already recognized the implication of this
unregulability:
There exists an extremely powerful instrument that none of us will
ever manage to regulate; there exists means of communication that,
unlike means of production, are not controllable either by private
will or by the community. In confronting them, all of us, from the
head of CBS to the president of the United States, from Martin
Heidegger to the poorest fellah of the Nile delta, all of us are the
proletariat.74
172. See Thomas W. Lippman, Seychelles Offers Investors Safe Haven for $10 Million, WASH.
POST, Dec. 31, 1995, at A27.
173. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 14.
174. UMBERTO Eco, Towards a Semiological Guerilla Warfare, in TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY
141 (William Weaver trans., 1986) (1967) (emphasis in original). Cf. DEBORD, supra note 7, at
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Should right-wing censors suddenly find in themselves a strange urge
to echo Marx's call for unification, it will be of no avail. The only kind
of revolution that computer-mediated communication will ever
sponsor is the information technology revolution itself in which
computers and late capitalism will continue to flourish all the more
effectively.175
C. Sex and Violence as Commodity
Why should cyber-consumers submit to an Orwellian "liberation"
from indecency when sex and violence are the very fruits of desire in
postmodern hyperreality? When images can be produced and
reproduced essentially at will, they lose their "auratic" quality and
become interchangeable. The only thing that counts, as Walter
Benjamin recognized sixty years ago, is the shock value. 76 This shock
value is what allows an image to stand out from the rest of the crowd
of mediated images and simulations that comprise our hyperreality.
Indeed, it may be that shock is the only way to communicate in an era
of generalized information.177
The legislative sponsors of the CDA saw the tree, but they missed
the forest. Senator Coats:
When sexual violence and gross indecency are available to anyone
at the touch of a button, both an individual or a culture become
desensitized. It is not always that people emulate this material, but
Thesis 26 ("The triumph of an economic system founded on separation leads to the
proletarianization of the world." (emphasis in original)).
175. See Van Alstyne, supra note 169 ("There can exist libertarian tendencies within
cyberspace (by all means, the more the merrier), but ultimately it cannot be fundamentally
liberating. To do so it would have to succeed in dismantling itself. But this will never happen.").
176. See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217-51 (Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (1936).
177. See BERNARD TSCHUMI, Six Concepts, in ARCHITECTURE AND DISJUNCTION 248 (1994).
Walter Kendrick has made a similar observation with regard to the pornographic image:
If the smut of fifty or even twenty years ago looks tame by comparison with
today's, the reason may have nothing to do with pornography itself. Every mode of
representation has become explicit in the same years, in every nonsexual realm; it has
become possible to photograph the earth from outer space, a fetus in the womb, and
Vietnamese children in the process of dying. The only difference in the case of
pornography is that it faces steady resistance, while these other advances in explicitness
win praise for contributing to the enrichment of knowledge.
WALTER KENDRICK, THE SECRET MUSEUM: PORNOGRAPHY IN MODERN CULTURE 221 (1987). I would
suggest that Kendrick's "steady resistance" is, in fact, simulated to save face. The need for ever
greater explicitness cannot be denied for the individual seeking to make some contact with
reality, some way to overcome her separation and alienation, but it can never be fully satisfied
either.
often you can become immune to it. The images and messages act
like a novocaine on our national conscience. They numb our
capacity for outrage.
What used to outrage us now becomes almost
commonplace. . .. I think they have numbed us to the shock that
used to be present when this kind of material was exposed.
178
This characterization recognizes the anesthetizing influence of a media
culture in which history and meaning and even outrage are dissolved
(or packaged as another spectacular image or aestheticized and
"xeroxized"1'). But it fails to grasp that this drug, which is not simply
images of violence, sex, and indecency, but our whole postmodern
condition, has the dual effect of stimulating desire for the consumption
of even more images, whose shock value must continue to ratchet ever
higher in order to satisfy even temporarily. A society that spends
billions of dollars every year to be "entertained" by movies and videos
with ever more spectacular violence-and we need not consider only
the apocalyptic fantasy violence of the science fiction/Terminator
genre when the literally "eye-popping" violence of Martin Scorsese's
Casino will do-and that elevates Seinfeld, Roseanne, and Friends,
with storylines of masturbation, lesbian kisses, and lesbian weddings,
respectively, into the Top Ten (and these latter two in what used to be
the so-called family hour), such a society is not a society crying
"uncle." In fact, despite the chest-pounding spectacle of certain vocal
minorities, the public complains very little about excessive violence
and indecency."8
And why should they complain? Jean Baudrillard's description of
the greatness of the "entire (un)culture" of America, in the eyes of a
traveling modern-day de Tocqueville, can be applied equally to
traveling in the hyperreality of cyberspace:
A miracle of obscenity that is genuinely American: a miracle of
total availability, of the transparency of all functions in space,
though this latter nonetheless remains unfathomable in its vastness
and can only be exorcised by speed.
178. 141 CONG. REc. S8333 (daily ed. June 14, 1995)(statement of Sen. Coats)(emphasis
added).
179. Cf. TsCHUMI, supra note 177, at 235 ("Just as Stealth Bombers were estheticized on the
televised Saudi Arabian sunset, just as sex is estheticized in advertising, so all of culture . . . is
now estheticized, 'xeroxized."').
180. See Reed Hundt, Chairman of the FCC, Keynote Address at the Duke Law Journal
Administrative Law Conference (Feb. 16, 1996)(stating that each year the FCC receives only
about 100 complaints on violence and 1000 complaints on indecency and that approximately 90%
of the complaints concern radio, not television)(videotape on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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The Italian miracle: that of stage and screen.
The American miracle: that of the obscene.
The profusion of sense, as against the deserts of
meaninglessness. 181
The cyber-miracle, however, combines stage, screen, and obscene,
simulations all, and each allowing the consumption of meaningless
illusion in our commodified postmodern culture. Any variety of
obscenity one could want appears to be miraculously available in
cyberspace, the geographical spatial transaction totally transparent to
the consumer who cares only that the vastness of the cyberrealm is
mediated by instantaneous communication, permitting him to exercise
and exorcise his pornographic desires digitally.
The infamous Marty Rimm "study", of pornography on the
information superhighway, for all its flaws, illustrates well the
spectacular character of cyberporn, its apparently miraculous
availability, and the debate it has spawned.18 Despite the fact that
most pornographic images are not available on the Internet itself,
183
but instead are available through private adult commercial bulletin
boards (BBSs), Rimm reports that the demand for soft-core and hard-
core images is small, even in proportion to the relatively small
availability of such images. Instead, what drives the adult BBS market
is a demand for "paraphilic and pedo/hebephilic" images that exceeds
supply. 18 In other words, consumers are affirmatively seeking out the
extreme in order to be shocked. Apparently the cyberporn consumer
is no longer seduced by pedestrian Sirens, like the cold-hearted
Sharon Stone whose simulated sex, made colder by the cold media, is
181. JEAN BAUDRILLARD, AMERICA 8 (Chris Turner trans., 1988).
182. See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey
of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by
Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849
(1995).
183. Indeed, it is generally difficult to actually find hard-core pornography on the Internet,
what the CDA's sponsors said they were most concerned about, see 141 CONG. REC. S8330 (June
14, 1995)(statement of Sen. Exon); id. at S8333 (statement of Sen. Coats), but it is very easy to
return to it once found. Recently, however, the availability of hard-core pornography, and ease in
initially finding it, seems to be tracking the general growth of interest in the World Wide Web.
The CDA has evidently not struck fear into the hearts of pornographers, demonstrating both the
unregulable nature of cyberspace and the insatiable desire by consumers for such images.
184. See Rimm, supra note 182, at 1890. Rimm defines "paraphilic" images to be those
depicting "transvestite, transsexual, sadomasochism (B&D/S&M), fisting, urophilia, coprophilia,
foreign objects, voyeurism, bestiality, and incest," and "pedo/hebephilic" images to be those
depicting "both nude portraits of young children in pre-pubescence, and hard-core sex acts
involving young-looking boys and girls." Id. at 1885.
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too transparent to satisfy any longer the thirst for masturbatory
illusion.
More spectacular than even the apparent conclusions of Rimm's
study is the media hype that thrust the whole issue, including Rimm's
own Warholian fifteen minutes of fame, into a hyperspace of layered
illusion. Not only is there Rimm's role in triggering censorship at
Carnegie-Mellon University, but there is the Time magazine cover
story on cyberporn, a torrent of backlash from civil libertarians,
debates on Nightline, and evidence that the Religious Right
manipulated Rimm and his study for the precise purpose of fueling the
flames of the CDA controversy.1 As spectacle begets spectacle, its
monopolization of the realm of appearances is instantiated. 186 Neither
postmodern culture nor the nature of cyberspace is altered one iota.
In fact, it must be frankly admitted, as others have recognized in
the past, that the indecent and the pornographic represent, not merely
some marginal edge, but the leading edge of cyberspace capabilities, as
they have for information technologies in the past.1" Pornographers
have spurred the development and rapid proliferation of graphical
interfaces, anonymous re-mailers, and other privacy technologies in
order to colonize cyberspace more quickly. Pornography's exploitation
of new media is not a bane to the stability of society, but is rather a
boon to our capitalistic economy, underwriting technological
development. Prodding at that mythical bane, Anne Wells Branscomb
has argued that the availability of sexually explicit materials may
185. The following is by no means an exhaustive survey, but see as illustrative Elmer-Dewitt,
supra note 168; Donna L. Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed Critique of the Time Article:
"On a Screen Near You Cyberporn (Dewitt, 7/3/95)" (visited Dec. 16, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/
pub/Censorship/Pornography/Rimm-CMU-Timetime-hoffmannovak.critique>; Donna L.
Hoffman & Thomas P. Novak, A Detailed Analysis of the Conceptual, Logical, and
Methodological Flaws in the Article: "Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway"
(visited Dec. 16, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorship/Pornography/Rimm_CMUTime/
rimmhoffman..novak.critique>; Mike Godwin, JournoPorn: Dissection of the Time Scandal: The
Shoddy Article (visited Dec. 16, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/pub/Censorship/Pomography/
RimmCMUTime/joumopomgodwin.article> (originally appeared in HOTWIRED (Sept. 1995)
<http://www.hotwired.com/special/pomscare/godwin.html>); Mike Godwin, Who's Using Who?
Martin Rimm and the Antiporn Activists (visited Dec. 16, 1996)<http://www.eff.org/
pub/Censorship/Pomography/Rimm-CMU-Time/rimm-rright-links-godwinarticle>; Jeffrey E.
Faucette, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity Doctrine and a Frightened
University's Censorship of Sex on the Internet, 44 DUKE L.J. 1155 (1995).
186. See DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 12.
187. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of
Pornography on the Information Superhighway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society?, 83
GEo. L.J. 1935, 1935-36 (1995)(discussing the printing press, videotapes, laser discs, CD-ROMs,
and the French Minitel system, in addition to the Internet).
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actually serve legitimate public policy goals, such as ameliorating the
world's overpopulation by curbing the urge to procreate.' But
whether public policy appears to be served is of no matter. In the
realm of the cyber-spectacle, it is pointless to question whether society
should think the unthinkable. The unthinkable is being produced and
consumed every day. This is the way the world is. The indecent and
the pornographic cannot be erased from our culture.1' The First
Amendment, which protects both, should be not be debased in a
misbegotten and ultimately futile attempt to do so.
Just as the CDA's indecency ban cannot stop indecency in
cyberspace, the television ratings provisions will not protect us or our
children from the mediated images of sex, violence, and other indecent
material that fill our airwaves or slither through our cable boxes.
Because the computer-mediated communications of cyberspace are
already phenomenologically equivalent to those of television, society's
desire for escalating shock-value will not distinguish between the
channels of delivery. The need will be fulfilled by whatever means
happen to be most convenient. If a ratings system is implemented, we
will not see a decline in violence and indecency on television, as the V-
chip's proponents hope and claim (although, obviously, but not
paradoxically, this is one of the arguments to make to demonstrate the
system's unconstitutional censorship). Instead, we should expect to see
precisely the opposite. Under the guise that our children are being
protected by the V-chip, programmers will no longer feel a public
obligation to self-censor as they do now. In order to make their
products stand out in the crowded field of images, especially to the
demographically-desirable hip younger generation, advertisers will
sponsor that programming that can satisfy the culture's need for the
188. Id. at 1955-57. Branscomb specifically suggests that if sexually explicit materials can be
shown
to satisfy rather than to stimulate the procreative urges of a species out of control, then
sexually stimulating images might offer an alternative method of satisfying sexual
urges, thus mitigating the crisis of global overpopulation. Indeed, to think the
unthinkable, should the planet become insufferably overpopulated, it might become
morally acceptable, even politically desirable, to promote traffic in images that
encourage lesbian or homosexual, rather than heterosexual, behavior-images that
today may be considered irresponsible or offensive, if not legally "indecent" or
"obscene."
Id. at 1955-56.
189. Cf. DEBORt, supra note 7, at Thesis 16 ("The spectacle subjects living human beings to
its will to the extent that the economy has brought them under its sway. For the spectacle is
simply the economic realm developing for itself-at once a faithful mirror held up to the
production of things and a distorting objectification of the producers.").
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new, the different, the extreme-i.e., the more violent and the more
indecent. As one high-ranking network executive has reportedly
stated, "If there's a rating system and a V-chip in place, then I want to
put on Terminator 2, and I will no longer edit it."'° This is how bluntly
power is wielded in the realm of hyperreality. Not only is the CDA's
television ratings scheme grossly impracticable,19' but its very
existence will hasten the arrival of even greater televised violence and
indecency, which our children will be soaking up at the neighbor's.
D. Implications for First Amendment Jurisprudence in a Postmodern
Millennium
In the realm of the postmodern cyber-spectacle, censorship such
as that presented by the CDA, which is merely spectacle itself, 9
really ought to represent the easy case. Current First Amendment
jurisprudence, properly conceived, appears more than adequate to
strike down as unconstitutional such ill-conceived legislation."9 Even
should a court foolhardily uphold the CDA, it will ultimately be of
little consequence to cyberspeech itself since, because the Act is
fundamentally unenforceable, society will essentially route around it
or ignore it. This is not to say, however, that the CDA, either struck
down or upheld, is of no consequence. By failing to understand the
implications of cyberspace, Congress or courts jeopardize respect for
the rule of law when they pass or uphold unenforceable laws.
The really difficult issue, which is immanent in postmodern
culture and made especially apparent by the cyber-spectacle, is the
commodification of all aspects of culture, including speech. It is not
simply that cyber-shopping or on-line banking blurs the distinction
between the transaction and the speech that concerns the transaction
in terms of commercial speech jurisprudence.1 4 Rather, in our
190. Tom Shales, Chip of Fools; Any Way You Program It, the V-Chip Is a Long Stride
Toward Censorship, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1996, at G01 (quoting a high-ranking network
executive who asked not to be identified).
191. See supra text accompanying note 134.
192. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
193. See supra parts II-Ill.
194. But see Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1085 (1994)(arguing that because "commercial speech is
expression about goods and services, as distinct from the actual transactions," cyberspace will
"blur this distinction")(citations omitted).
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information economy, speech is the product.19 As Ronald Collins and
David Skover have argued:
In our culture of advanced capitalism, there is a striking
redundancy in the notion of "commercial speech." . . . [T]o
overlook the relationship between commerce and communication is
to place the First Amendment in a false light. To comprehend more
fully the phenomenon of commercial speech, we must look beyond
First Amendment cases and commentary to the actual ways in which
our culture communicates about and through commodities. We must
think less about the marketplace of ideas and more about the
marketing of items.
196
Because in postmodernity speech is mediated through images, the
marketplace of ideas has been transformed into a marketplace of
images, of simulacra. The critique offered by contemporary cultural
studies makes it very tough for First Amendment jurists merely to
accord second-class status to all commodified speech without
jettisoning most of the ideals of First Amendment jurisprudence along
the way.' Although some may simply choose to ignore speech's
characterization as a commodity,1  that approach ignores a cultural
dominant that prizes Madison Avenue over Madisonian ideals.
199
While we could say that the First Amendment should protect
commodified speech because capitalism is about "speech in the service
of selling,"" it's not about commodity, it's about spectacle[,
Stupid]: "The spectacle is capital accumulated to the point where it
becomes image."'
1
195. See M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First
Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1697 n.48 (1995)("In an economy in which the core activity is
informational .... commercial speech will not be speech about a product but will be the
product." (emphasis in original)).
196. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REv.
697, 698-99 (1993). See also Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The First Amendment in an
Age of Paratroopers, 68 TEx. L. REV. 1087 (1990).
197. Ethan Katsh suggests that "according second-class status to commercial speech and
distinguishing commercial speech from other kinds of speech will be as frustrating as imposing a
prior restraint on information moving around a network at electronic speed." Katsh, supra note
195, at 1697 n.48.
19& See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 75, at 1780 (arguing that "speech should not be treated as
a simple commodity, especially in a period dominated by attention to sensationalistic scandals
and low-quality fare").
199. Cf. Collins & Skover, Commerce & Communication, supra note 196, at 746
("Madisonian ideals are slouching toward Madison Avenue.").
200. Id. at 699,745. This is the approach Collins and Skover dishearteningly propose.
201. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 34 (emphasis in original).
Unlike most post-structuralist and deconstructionist analyses, this
postmodern critique will suggest a way out: Just as the lens on the
cyber-spectacle of the CDA has shown that a jurisprudence of
differing tiers of First Amendment protection can no longer withstand
scrutiny in a world of converging technologies and media, as, for
example, with relaxed standards for the broadcast medium or the
marginal acceptance of indecency,2m so, too, will a First Amendment
regime offering lesser protection for commercial speech falter in a
postmodern culture where speech-as-image is reified as commodity.
Fortunately, the problem lies in First Amendment jurisprudence and
not in the First Amendment itself. Perhaps it is time to re-evaluate the
wisdom behind the apparent folly of Justice Hugo Black's absolutist
position.A2 Either we shall decide that the First Amendment literally
means what it says-" Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press" -- or we shall decide, following
our current course, that what it means is confusing and confused, or
perhaps even nothing at all, a free-floating sign without even an
arbitrary referent.05 In the new millennium, it would be easier to take
the first approach, for if we take the latter we will be forced to endure
spectacle after spectacle, just like the CDA.
Hyperrealistically, we will almost certainly not be taking that first
course. Even if the marketplace of ideas is found to have evaporated
202. For the quintessential case that relies on both, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978).
203. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141-43 (1959)(Black, J.,
dissenting)("I do not agree that laws . . . abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified
by a congressional or judicial balancing process. . . . Not only does this violate the genius of
our written Constitution, but it runs expressly counter to the injunction to Court and Congress
made by Madison when he introduced the Bill of Rights." (emphasis in original)); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293, 295 (1964)(Black, J., concurring)("In my opinion the
Federal Constitution . . . has grant[ed] the press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way
public officials do their public duty.").
204. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
205. Two Justices in Denver Area Consortium suggest a promising, but apparently unstable,
middle ground staked out by the Hippocratic precept, "First, do no harm." Yet this admonition
adopted by Justice Souter did not prevent him from joining Justice Breyer's plurality opinion
that allowed private cable operators to prohibit patently offensive material from being
transmitted over leased access channels. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC, 116 S. Ct. 374, 2403 (1996)(Souter, J., concurring). See also supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text. Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, recognized that the real question is
"whether the harm is in sustaining the law or striking it down. If the plurality is concerned about
technology's direction, it ought to begin by allowing speech, not suppressing it." Denver Area
Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2407 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(emphasis
added).
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into a poverty of meaningless posturing, we can rest assured that the
marketplace of items, desire, and pseudo-gratification will continue to
flourish. If some of us are scared to stumble onto cyber-images of sex,
violence, and indecency, or afraid to have our children actively seeking
them out, then the market will provide filtering tools. If others would
prefer to wire their nerve endings directly to the mind-numbing
images, the market will oblige that, too. Whatever obstacles Congress
or the courts may place in the way, the market will consume them as
raw materials, producing more images for our delectation. The only
thing truly indecent is being forced, Clockwork Orange-style, to watch
the endless images of these institutions perpetually congratulating
themselves on how well they are protecting us from ourselves. It will
be a very long time, I fear, before we will be able to filter out that. 7
206. Cf. DEBORD, supra note 7, at Thesis 59 (stating that even "dissatisfaction itself becomes
a commodity as soon as the economics of affluence finds a way of applying its production
methods to this particular raw material").
207. Cf. id. at Thesis 24 ("By means of the spectacle the ruling order discourses endlessly
upon itself in an uninterrupted monologue of self-praise."); id. at Thesis 220 ("The fact is that a
critique capable of surpassing the spectacle must know how to bide its time." (emphasis in
original)).

